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Abstract
This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It
is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than
the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a
model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however,
that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can
bring stability to the status quo. It is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable
in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levels.  1998
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1. Introduction
It is supposed that in democratic societies public opinion is quite relevant when
deciding which tax policies should be adopted. It may be thought that the
implemented tax schedule is the outcome of some voting process. For example,
both the incumbent and the opposition party propose alternative tax policies and
the one with the most votes is implemented. An agent, who is usually assumed to
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be self-interested, would vote for the proposed alternative she prefers. This
approach may be criticized on the grounds that in real economies this type of
voting never takes place. However, as Roberts (1977) notes the essential point is
that parties behave and choices are made as if a vote on proposals were taken. That
is, when designing their tax proposals parties try to maximize the popular support
for their alternatives. A proposal is a majority winner (or a Condorcet winner) if it
obtains a majority of votes in pairwise confrontations with all the other alter-
natives. Such a tax policy would be stable and we would expect it to arise as the
equilibrium outcome in the parties competition game.
There is an important problem associated with this approach: the existence of
such a majority winner is not, in general, guaranteed (see Bucovetsky, 1991). This
is a serious difficulty due to the fact that, given a tax schedule, it is always
possible to design an alternative one that hurts a minority of agents and, at the
same benefits the rest. One way to overcome the problem is to impose restrictions
on the set of admissible tax schedules and on the preferences of agents. Thus, most
of this literature assumes that voting only takes place over the set of flat rate tax
policies (see for example Roberts (1977), Romer (1975, 1977) and Foley (1967)).
In these cases, and under some natural additional restrictions, the median income
voter’s ideal tax policy is a majority winner.
In Cukierman and Meltzer (1991), Snyder and Kramer (1988), Roemer (1994),
and Gans and Smart (1996) different tax functions are considered but some new,
also quite restrictive, assumptions are needed. In Snyder and Kramer (1988) only
tax functions which are individually optimal for some voter are allowed.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1991) analyze a model in which the tax functions are
quadratic in income. They provide sufficient conditions for the median voter’s
most preferred tax policy to be a majority winner. They also show that under
additional, rather strong conditions, such a tax function is progressive. Roemer
(1994) provides some simulated equilibria in a model with constituency-represent-
ing parties and uncertainty. But the admissible tax functions are also quadratic in
income. Gans and Smart (1996) show that the majority preference relation over
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convex tax schedules satisfying a ‘single-crossing’ property is quasi-transitive.
Thus, unless we impose very strong restrictions, there exists no majority winner.
Therefore, this political approach to tax determination predicts a lot of instability
on the tax schedules. The reason being that ‘...voting over redistributive tax
schedules is much like a majority-rule divide-the-dollar game, and there is no hope
to obtain the existence of a static equilibrium in such a game’ (Piketty, 1992, page
8).
1This is an interesting result. It however rules out the important comparisons of functions that cross
each other at more than one point.
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2But in most democratic countries tax schedules are quite stable. It appears,
then, that the theory should be modified to capture this fact (see Piketty (1992) for
a discussion of all these issues and critical comments on some alternative
approaches found in the literature).
In this paper we analyze the existence of a majority winner in a political model
of tax determination in which the income distribution is fixed — so many
incentive considerations are left aside. In order to achieve positive results the
analysis will concentrate on models with the following two properties: (i) the set
of admissible income tax functions will consist of all concave and all convex
increasing functions (including linear functions) which collect an exogenously
given tax amount. (ii) It will be assumed that there is a status quo tax schedule and
agents compare it with new proposals. Furthermore, when making these com-
parisons agents are certain about the tax liabilities associated with the status quo
but attach some uncertainty to the tax liability of the alternative proposal.
Property (i) imposes two important restrictions on our model. Firstly, we
analyze problems in which the total tax amount to be collected has been already
decided so that the only political issue is how to collect it. Secondly, tax functions
showing, for example, increasing marginal rates in some income intervals and
decreasing marginal rates in others are not allowed. However compared with the
previous literature these are weak restrictions. Moreover, most income tax
schedules in western countries are convex (increasing marginal tax rate).
Considering only convex and concave functions is not enough of a restriction to
obtain a majority winner. Consider for example a strictly convex income tax
function. It is possible to find a different one which is also convex, collects the
same amount and renders a majority of agents better off. The basic trick to obtain
such a function is the following: increase the taxes for people belonging to a very
small income interval around, for example, the median (people in that interval
have to be a minority of agents). Then, reduce the taxes for all agents with income
above that interval. A simple picture could help the reader to see that this can be
done in such a way that the new function is convex, collects the same amount as
the first one and a majority of agents pay equal or less taxes. For convex functions
with linear parts a very similar trick will do it. In the case of a concave or linear
function, it can be proved that any convex one is preferred by a majority of agents
˜ ´(see Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortın, 1995).
Thus, in spite of this restriction on the set of admissible tax schedules, our
problem still remains similar to the ‘divide-the-dollar’ problem. In other words,
2This is a relative concept and one might believe that tax schedules are not stable. Moreover, recent
tax reforms like the one that took place in the USA in the 1980s could be seen as a proof of such
instability. However the net effect of those tax reforms is not clear yet and many authors believe that
the effective rates remain quite the same (see Kasten et al. (1994), Musgrave (1987)).
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there is still enough flexibility to beat any given tax schedule by a tax reform
involving a redistribution among taxpayers which benefits a majority of them.
Property (ii) captures the most innovative part of the model. It assumes that
agents have better information on the status quo than on proposals which have not
been implemented yet.
One may see this property as a very ad hoc feature to achieve positive results.
We believe that, on the contrary, it is a very natural feature and it is worth
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exploiting it in this type of environment. In real modern economies tax policies
are usually very complex. Such policies have to describe the amount due by each
income base level. This part is, in most cases, very simple. But the calculation of
this income base depends on personal exemptions, standard deductions, two-earner
deductions, income averaging, etc. A tax reform will normally involve changes in
these features and we should not expect agents to be well informed on all these
complexities. Things can become even more complicated if we consider income
and corporate taxation (Sheffrin (1994) explores the way people perceive tax
policies. It is shown that agents have a very imperfect knowledge on these issues.
See also Musgrave, 1987).
An additional justification of our approach could be given by the fact that policy
designers cannot accurately estimate the tax revenue that would be obtained under
an alternative tax schedule. Thus, agents would believe that, should a new policy
be implemented, it may well be the case that taxes collected were short of the
target level (or exceeded it) and consequently the tax rates (or the income base)
will have to be modified. The status quo, on the contrary, has already been
4implemented and each agent knows how much she paid.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) provides a nice example of this assumption
on agent’s uncertainty about tax reforms. According to Minarik (1989, page 293),
during the Congressional debate on TRA ‘...one senator argued against the bill on
the ground that 75% of the respondents to a poll said they expected their taxes to
be higher — while the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that 79% of those
whose taxes would change would receive a tax cut once the law was fully phased
in. Presumably, at least 54% of the population would receive a tax cut, but did not
believe it’. The author also analyzes the reasons why taxpayers are misinformed
and might expect the worst from a tax reform.
It is clear that the type of uncertainty we consider here makes things harder for
alternative tax schedules. Assuming that all agents are risk averse, a proposal that,
under no uncertainty beats the status quo, might well be opposed by a majority of
3A similar idea has been used in Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985). They consider an abstract model
in which voters do not believe the winning party will always implement the proposed policy. Also,
voters perceive the incumbent as less risky than challengers. They show that the equilibrium policy
does not coincide with the median voter’s ideal policy.
4An alternative approach would assume that agents are uncertain about their future income. This
possibility is not exploited in this paper.
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agents. It is clear then that we need to impose some structure and restrictions on
the way uncertainty is modeled. Otherwise, we could render the whole approach
trivial and useless. Thus, it will be assumed that each agent believes that her
expected tax under an alternative tax schedule coincides with the announced tax
liability. So we do not consider agents to expect the ‘worst’ from a tax reform.
They are uncertain but not pessimistic about it.
For a tax function to obtain more popular support than the status quo it is not
enough that the proposed tax liability is lower for a majority of agents. It is also
needed that this tax cut is big enough to compensate agents for the risk associated
with it. We think that this may capture very real situations. Consider for example a
tax reform that announces a 0.5% reduction in taxes for 90% of taxpayers and a
5% raise for the rest. Even though, the majority of agents are expected to be better
off under this reform it seems clear that (ex-ante) it would get little popular
support.
Which concave or convex tax functions may arise as majority winner status quo
for reasonable levels of uncertainty and risk aversion? This, unfortunately, turns
out to be a hard question. Our analysis, then, will concentrate on a very specific
but important case: when can a flat-rate tax schedule be a majority winner status
quo?
Without uncertainty a linear tax function is always defeated by any convex one.
Thus we now want to know whether incorporating uncertainty may prevent this
from happening. The main result in this paper shows that a flat-rate tax policy is a
majority winner status quo depending on a reduced number of parameters. In
particular, only three statistics of the income distribution are relevant: the mean,
the median and the percentage of total income owned by the richest 50%. It will be
shown that economies with very egalitarian distributions of income (in the sense
of small percentage of total income held by the richest 50%) and high taxation
levels are the best candidates to have such a linear status quo. That is, these
economies require smaller amounts of uncertainty and risk aversion for a linear
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status quo to become a majority winner. The insight behind this is simple. In an
economy with a very unequal income distribution and low taxation levels a linear
tax function can be defeated by a convex one which brings large (in percentage)
tax cuts for the majority. In the case of an egalitarian distribution it is only
possible to beat the linear tax with convex functions that provide small tax cuts for
the majority.
The mentioned result only implies that it is relatively easier for a linear tax
schedule to be a majority winner in egalitarian economies. But the needed level of
uncertainty may be too high even in those most favorable cases. This is, of course,
a matter of empirical estimation. We provide some rough calibrations to realistic
parameter values and conclude that at least for some egalitarian societies (in which
5This seems paradoxical since those egalitarian economies usually have very progressive tax
schedules.
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the richest 50% owns around 60% of the total income) moderate levels of
uncertainty can make a linear tax a majority winner.
It should be remarked that even though we do not provide precise conditions for
a convex tax function to be a stable status quo our analysis gives important hints
on it. It is intuitive that, in general, it is easier to ‘beat’ a linear function than a
convex one. We can believe, then, that it is more probable to observe a convex
function than a linear one as a majority winner status quo. Moreover, many
different convex functions could all be stable. Thus our approach would allow for
the possibility that economies with similar income distributions present different
convex tax schedules.
The main message in the paper is that, in order to beat the status quo, a tax
proposal should not only reduce taxes for a majority of agents. It is also needed
that such reduction is large enough. There is also an alternative interpretation of
our model which does not need to consider uncertainty on the alternative tax
policy. Under such an alternative interpretation, the question would be how to
defeat the status quo, not by the largest number of votes, but by proposing the
‘maximum’ improvement for a majority of agents. This is an important question
which arises in many political models (see for example Hinich et al., 1972) where
a voter’s probability of voting diminishes as the utility differential between
alternatives decreases). Suppose, for example, that voters consider two issues when
deciding for which party to vote. The first one is the tax policy and the second the
position of the parties on some non-economic issue. It might be the case that a
majority of agents prefer the position of the incumbent party on the non-economic
issue. In this case the challenger party may want to propose a tax policy which is
also preferred by a majority of agents. However, for this party to obtain a majority
of votes this may not be enough. Perhaps the improvement in utility experienced
by the agents associated with such an alternative tax policy has to be quite large to
compensate for the position on the other issue. The question, then, is to know the
tax policy which, among those preferred to the status quo by at least 50% of the
agents, reduces the taxes of this majority by the largest amount. Thus, the model
presented in this paper may also be useful in answering this question. We will,
however, stick to the first interpretation, that exploits the fact that agents perceive
the status quo as less risky than new proposals, to obtain our results on the stability
of the tax policy.
2. The model
We consider a population of agents whose income is distributed according to the
1
fixed density function f defined on the interval [0,1] with ef(x)dx 5 1. We identify
0an agent with her income x[[0,1].
A1. All the admissible income tax functions t must satisfy the following
requirements
6
1. For each x[[0,1], 0# t(x)#x.
2. The tax function t(x) is continuous and non-decreasing.
1
3. et(x)f(x)dx 5 R where R is some fixed real positive number.
0
The first requirement says that tax liabilities cannot exceed income and that
redistribution of income is not allowed. In Section 3 we will comment on a case in
which redistribution is possible. The second requirement is a very natural
condition. Note that we do not require t to be differentiable at all points.
Requirement 3 states that the total tax collected must meet the target R. Through
this paper, Assumption 1 will be assumed.
We will distinguish between the tax function that is already in place and any
alternative tax function that can be proposed. We denote the status quo tax function
by q(x), and a new proposal by t(x). At this point we do not need to be very
specific about how the status quo came to place and the way a proposal is
announced. Our only objective will be to compare the popular support obtained by
a given status quo versus any alternative tax function. It is important to note that
both functions q(x) and t(x) must satisfy Assumption 1. In particular, the proposed
function t(x) must be such that, were it implemented, the total tax collected would
coincide with the total tax collected under the status quo, i.e. the amount R. Thus
we are assuming that the only differences between alternative tax functions are
about how to collect the already fixed amount R.
A2. All agents have the same (ex-post) utility function on money u(x), with u9.0
and u0,0. Furthermore, this function has constant relative risk aversion, i.e.
2x(u0(x)) /u9(x)5s for all x[[0,1].
Given the status quo q and a proposal t we write qs t (resp. q| t) wheneverx x
u(x2q(x)).u(x2t(x)), (resp. u(x2q(x))5u(x2t(x)). Since u is increasing, qs tx
(q|t) is equivalent to q(x),t(x), (q(x)5t(x)). Let V;hx:qs tj and V9;hx:q| tj.x x
We suppose that when indifferent between t and q, agents ‘prefer’ q with
probability 1 /2. Let N(q,t);e f(x)dx10.5 e f(x)dx. (We will suppose that VV V 9
and V9 are measurable sets). Thus N(q,t) indicates the percentage of agents who
prefer q better than t. This is a measure of the popular support for the status quo
when it faces alternative t. Agents might express their support for a tax policy by
means of an election or by polls, but here we do not need to specify it. All the
information required to determine N(q,t) can be deduced from the preferences of
the agents in pairwise comparisons between the status quo and alternative tax
functions. However, we will say that agent x votes for q whenever qs t.x
Definition 1. The status quo q is a Condorcet winner if N(q,t)$1/2, for all t.
We now introduce the basic assumption of the approach taken in this paper: it is
assumed that when comparing q and t agents have better information on the first
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one. Thus, we will impose an asymmetry in the way agents compare the status quo
and the proposal. The status quo has been already implemented and agents are sure
about its consequences, i.e. agent x knows exactly how much she has to pay under
the tax scheme q(x). It will be assumed, however, that even though the nominal tax
under t is t(x), agent x is uncertain about how much she will end up paying should
6this alternative tax scheme be implemented. We will suppose that agent x believes
that her ex-ante expected tax burden under t will coincide with the nominal tax
t(x), but the actual amount paid, ex-post, could be different. Since it will also be
assumed that agents are risk averse this uncertainty about t would give an
advantage to the status quo. One question to study, then, will be whether small
degrees of uncertainty are enough to guarantee now the existence of a Condorcet
winner.
The uncertainty about the function t can be modeled in many different ways. In
this paper it will be assumed that agent’s x beliefs on the tax she will end up
paying depend only on t(x). An alternative approach would make those beliefs
depend on x. As long as tax functions take always positive values, the two
approaches yield the same type of results. We will comment more on it in Section
4. The following assumption specifies the way we incorporate such uncertainty.
A3. Given the announced tax function t, any agent x[[0,1] believes that if t is
implemented she will pay either the amount t(x)1et(x) or the amount t(x)2et(x),
where 1.e$0. The probability of each of these alternatives is 1/2. The constant e
will be referred as the degree of uncertainty.
Note that the expected tax payment coincides with the announced tax liability
7t(x). Thus, it is assumed that agents believe in the proposal in expectation terms.
A controversial aspect of Assumption 3 is that the degree of uncertainty e is a
constant independent of the level t(x). Thus all agents believe that the tax paid will
deviate from the announced nominal level in the same percentage. Even though the
paper does not provide a justification of this assumption we believe this is a
natural way to tackle the uncertainty problem. Moreover our basic results would
also hold if the degree of uncertainty were an increasing function of t(x).
Since we will be interested in the existence of a Condorcet winner for not very
large degrees of uncertainty it will be assumed that for all income levels
x2t(x)2et(x)$0.
Assumption 3 changes the way agents compare q and t since the proposal t is
now an uncertain alternative. Let U(t,x,e), denote agent’s x expected utility from
6We could also assume that tax payers are uncertain about the final tax paid under both t and q. The
qualitative results would not change if the uncertainty on t is greater than the uncertainty on q.
7In many real situations there may exist an additional uncertainty about the expected tax. For
example, some agents could consider that, in order to obtain the public approval, the announced t
underestimates the expected tax.
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1 1
] ]the proposed tax t, i.e. U(t,x,e); u(x2t(x)2et(x))1 u(x2t(x)1et(x)). We also2 2
write U(q,x);u(x2q(x)).
A4. For all x[[0,1] we have qs t⇔U(q,x).U(t,x,e), (q| t⇔U(q,x)5U(t,x,e)).x x
Thus, agents behave as self-interested expected utility maximizers. Let F;
hx:qs tj, and F9;hx:q| tj. It is also supposed (as we did in the certainty case)x x
that whenever q| t, agent x ‘votes’ for the status quo with probability 1 /2. Letx
N(q,t,e)5e f(x)dx10.5 e f(x)dx. Thus N(q,t,e) denotes the mass of agents whoF F 9
prefer q over t when the degree of uncertainty is e.
The next definition is the natural extension of Definition 1 to this environment
with uncertainty on t.
8Definition 2. The status quo tax function q is stable for the degree of uncertainty
e if for all t we have N(q,t,e)$1/2.
Since N(q,t,0)5N(q,t) it is clear that there exists t such that N(q,t,0),1/2. For
extremely large degrees of uncertainty the opposite would be true, i.e. for e9 large
enough N(q,t,e9).1/2, for all t. This follows from the fact that agents are risk
averse. Obviously this extreme case is of no relevance for our analysis. What we
would like to find is the minimum e that guarantees the stability of q. This is
however a quite difficult question. Thus, our strategy now will be to impose
additional restrictions that allow us to obtain positive results.
3. The main results
In this section we give conditions under which a linear tax function q(x)5ax is
stable for a given degree of uncertainty. If the only restrictions imposed on the
admissible proposals are given by Assumption 1 the problem would be quite
intractable. The reason for this difficulty is that there are many possible ways in
which the linear function q and a non-decreasing t, can cross each other. Thus,
additional restrictions on the set of admissible tax functions are needed.
A5. The proposed tax function t must be concave or convex.
This restriction simplifies the analysis since a convex (concave) function,
satisfying also Assumption 1, must cross the linear status quo q at only two points.
In many cases it can be interesting to allow for an exogenously given maximum
8Whenever it does not create confusion we will just say ‘stable’.
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marginal tax rate g#1. This can capture perhaps some incentive concerns and
since its value can be 1 it will not reduce the generality of our results.
1
Let m 5exf(x)dx stand for both the mean and the total income. Let m be the
m0
median of the income distribution, i.e. 0.5 5ef(x)dx.
0
A6. The density function f is such that m#m.
This is a very weak and natural restriction on the income distribution. It has
˜ ´important consequences however. In Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortın (1995) it is
shown that, for distribution functions satisfying the above assumption, if q is linear
and t concave then N(q,t)$1/2. Since N(q,t)5N(q,t,0)$1/2 then N(q,t,e)$1/2,
for all e$0, and the mentioned result implies that we do not need to consider
concave functions as successful proposals, i.e. if t is concave then N(q,t,e)$1/2,
for all e. Therefore only convex functions will have to be analyzed.
When uncertainty is allowed the existence of a stable linear status quo, q, will
depend on the degree of uncertainty e and on the degree of risk aversion s. Clearly
higher values of s increase the possibility of such a status quo.
The proof of our main result will make use of the function which minimizes the
tax burden of the agent with median income. We define next such a function and
provide some technical results.
Denote by z the set of tax functions satisfying the above assumptions and
consisting of only two marginal tax rates, i.e. if t[z then,
bx if x # x9t(x) 5H
cx 1 k if x $ x9 .
where x9[[0,1], b,c[[0,g], b,c, k#0. Let t [z be such that t (m)#t(m) for allm m
t[z. Thus, the tax function t minimizes, among all the two marginal ratem
functions, the tax liability of the agent with median income. In principle this tax
function does not need to be unique. For example, when R is small enough it is
possible to have many tax functions in z all of them requiring zero taxes from the
median income. It is straightforward to see that there exists a t such thatm
bx if x # d
t (x) 5Hm gx 1 k if x . d .
where m#d,1. Remark that g is the maximum marginal tax rate allowed and
that, by continuity, bm5gm1k. Whenever the tax function t is not unique, wem
pick one of the form just described. Nevertheless, the only indeterminacy about tm
is on g and d. The value of b is uniquely defined by the revenue requirement. A
simple computation shows that
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mg
]am 2 gr 1 2
]]]]]b 5 max 0, . (1)m5 6]m 2 r 1 2
1
where r 5exf(x)dx, a5R /m. Thus, b depends only on two statistics of the density
m
function f : the mean income and the total income held by the richest 50% group of
agents.
Note that a convex function t(x) which collects the same amount as the linear
status quo, q(x)5ax and satisfies t(0)#q(0) must intersect the graph of q at
exactly one point (other than 0). Furthermore, at that point, t(x) must intersect q
from below. This single-intersection property means that q is stable if and only if
there is no convex tax policy which is preferred by all the agents whose income is
below the median. The next proposition shows that to analyze the stability of the
status quo one only needs to compare t with the status quo q.m
Proposition 1. Suppose that the hypotheses 1 through 6 are satisfied. Let
q(x)5ax. Then q is a stable status quo if N(q,t ,e)$1/2.m
9Proof. The only part is clear. To see the other implication note that it follows
from Assumption 2 that the utility functions of the agents are of the form
1 2 s
u(x)5K 1K (x ) /12s for s–1, or u(x)5K 1K log(x) for s51, with K1 2 1 2 1
and K constant. Let t[z be an admissible tax function and assume s–1 (the case2
s51 follows from a similar argument). A straightforward computation shows that,
under Assumption 3, we have that t is preferred by agent x to the status quo q if
and only if
12s 12st(x) t(x) 12s1 ] ]]SS D S D D1 2 (1 1 «) 1 1 2 (1 2 «) . (1 2 a)2 x x
The left-hand side of the above inequality decreases with t(x) /x. Since the tax
function is convex, the average tax, t(x) /x, must increase with x. Hence, the set of
people who prefer t(x) to the status quo is some interval [0,X] of the income
distribution. It follows that the convex tax policy t will win the election if and only
if the median voter m prefers t over the status quo q. We construct now a tax
policy s(x) consisting of the two line segments connecting (0,0) with (m,t(m)) and
(m,t(m)) with (1,t(1)). Clearly, t (m)#s(m)#t(m). Therefore, if t defeats the statusm
quo, so does t .m
The consequence of the above proposition is clear: whenever we want to study
conditions to guarantee that the linear tax function is a Condorcet winner, it will be
enough to compare it with the one which minimizes the tax liability of the agent
9We thank an anonymous referee for providing this more intuitive version of our original proof.
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with median income. It follows that a necessary and sufficient condition for q to be
a Condorcet winner is given by the following inequality
1
]U(t , m, e) ; (u(m 2 bm 2 ebm) 1 u(m 2 bm 1 ebm)) , U(q, m) . (2)m 2
The closer b is to a the lower the value of e needs to be for the above inequality
to hold. Note that a necessary condition for Eq. (2) to be satisfied is that
a,b1eb. Hence the lowest possible value for the degree of uncertainty to
a
ˆ ]guarantee Eq. (2) is e 5 2 1.
b
Differentiating (see Appendix A) in Eq. (1) we have that, for b.0,
›b ›b ›(a /b )
] ] ]], 0 , 0, , 0 (3)
›r ›g ›a
Eq. (3) shows that the higher the concentration of income on the richest 50%
group the lower b is and therefore, other things the same, the more difficult it is
for q to be a Condorcet winner. This suggests the interesting result that it is in
economies with an equal distribution of income (in the sense of a low value of r)
in which a linear tax scheme can find enough popular support. It is also important
to remark on the nice fact that b depends only on the statistics m and r.
The derivatives in Eq. (3) also imply that allowing for a higher maximum
marginal tax rate reduces the possibilities for q of arising as a stable status quo.
This is less surprising than the former result. Greater values of g allow for lower
levels of b which makes it harder for q. The last derivative in Eq. (3) suggests that
higher values of a increase the chances of q being a Condorcet winner.
10It would appear, then, that societies with very high taxation levels and
egalitarian distribution of income are best candidates for adopting a linear tax
schedule. Although, at the same time it is in this type of societies where we
observe high marginal tax rates and, since, ›b /›g,0 and ›(a /b) /›a,0, this
makes more difficult for q to be a Condorcet winner.
The analysis above shows how simple it is now to check for stability of a linear
1 2 stax function. Namely, if u(x)5(x ) /12s, then it is immediately obvious that
N(q,t,e).1/2 if and only if
12s 12s 12s(1 2 a) . 0.5[(1 2 b 2 eb ) 1 (1 2 b 1 eb ) ] .
Many authors have defended a negative tax function, i.e. a function of the form
qˆ(x)5ax2k, as an alternative to the tax policies observed in most countries. It
might be said, then, that the relevant question to analyze is the possible stability of
ˆ ˆq (instead of q5ax). Note that q implies some income redistribution among
agents and Assumption 1 eliminated that possibility in our analysis. However, our
model can be easily extended to this important case with the additional restriction
ˆthat all the allowed functions t satisfy the inequality q(0)$t(0). The results of
10Remember that a also measures the percentage of total income collected as taxes
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such extension would be qualitatively identical to the ones we have provided here.
Thus, our analysis offers also some insights on the stability of a negative income
tax schedule.
4. Simulations
This section provides some numerical examples offering an approximate idea of
the possible magnitudes of the parameters. Table 1 shows values of b for several
realistic distributions of income and values of a (the percentage of total income
collected as taxes) and g (the maximum marginal tax rate). The mean and median
income are expressed in thousand of dollars and are close to the Spanish values for
´1989 (see Melis and Dıaz, 1993). Since the only other statistic necessary is r we
ˆdo not need to specify the whole income range. The parameter r stands for the
ˆpercentage of total income held by the richest 50% of the population, i.e. r;r /m.
Remember that the closer b and a are to each other the lower the degree of
uncertainty needed for the linear tax function to be a Condorcet winner. Thus, for
example, in the economy of the first row in the table we have a50.25, b50.14.
This implies that to make q a Condorcet winner the degree of uncertainty must be
ˆat least e 5 0.78. That is, agents must believe that the final tax paid will be
t(x)60.78t(x). Of course, the specific e that makes q a Condorcet winner depends
on the degree of risk aversion. In many cases e may turn out to be much larger
ˆthan e. Thus, in this example the linear tax seems clearly unstable. It is important
to remember, however, that the way uncertainty has been modeled here is really
unfavorable for the status quo: an agent believes that her tax liability will be either
(11e)t(x) or (12e)t(x). In reality, taxpayers might be more ‘pessimistic’ about the
implementation of alternative tax policies. For example, all our analysis can be
repeated assuming that agents believe that the tax liability will be (11e)t(x) with
probability p and (12e)t(x) with probability 12p, where p.1/2. With this bias
towards (11e)t(x) the stability of q would be guaranteed for lower values of e.
The second row provides an example that roughly fits the Spanish case (the
maximum marginal rate in Spain in 1989 was 56%, but things would not change
much if we take higher values of g). Here b takes the value zero and consequently
there is no e that makes q a Condorcet winner. However this is due to the fact that
uncertainty depends on the nominal tax t(x). As was already mentioned in Section
Table 1
Simulations
a g m m r b e
0 25 0 56 1 4 1 3 0 7 0 14 0 78
0 18 0 56 1 4 1 25 0 75 0 ‘
0 4 0 8 1 4 1 38 0 6 0 35 0 14
0 4 0 8 1 4 1 38 0 85 0 17 1 35
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2, under an alternative approach uncertainty would depend on the tax base x. In
that case, agent x believes that her tax liability will be t(x6ex). All the previous
results would also hold here. The only difference is that under this alternative
approach the degree of uncertainty that makes q a Condorcet winner would take
different values and, in particular, the minimum possible uncertainty level would
ˆbe e5a2b. The advantage of this alternative is that in principle q can be a
Condorcet winner even though b is zero. This suggests that the essential
parameters to analyze when deciding on the possibility of a stable status quo are a
and b. In the example we are commenting on, and regardless of the way we model
uncertainty, it seems that the linear tax function can hardly be a Condorcet winner.
The intuition is clear: a majority of the population would gain a lot by moving
11from q to t .m
The third row in the table shows an economy with a higher taxation level
(40%), high maximum marginal tax rate (80%) and a very egalitarian distribution
of income: the mean remains as in the second row but the median now is higher
and the richest 50% only own 60% of the total income. As a consequence b is
relatively close to a suggesting that here the linear tax could be a Condorcet
winner.
The economy in the last row is identical to the third one in all the parameters
ˆbut the percentage r. The corresponding value of b is quite far from a showing the
critical effect of r on the stability of the status quo.
The conclusion that arises after trying many other examples is that the distance
between a and b is quite sensitive to changes in the values of r and a.
5. Final comments
In this paper a model to analyze the stability of tax schedules has been
developed. The main characteristic of the model consists in the asymmetric way
agents assess the currently implemented tax policy versus a proposed new
alternative.
A tax policy is a majority winner if a majority of the population prefers it to any
other admissible policy in pairwise comparisons. It is well known that in a model
without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We have argued,
however, that in some cases this might not be a real problem since small amounts
of uncertainty can make the status quo a Condorcet winner.
We have mainly concentrated the analysis on the linear tax function. This is a
very specific, although quite important, case. The basic insight obtained is that it is
mostly in very egalitarian economies with high taxation levels that the linear
function might be stable.
11
˜This coincides with the empirical estimations on the Spanish case provided in Castaner (1991)
Approximately the poorest 53% of the taxpayers would see their taxes substantially increased if instead
of the 1988 tax schedule a linear one were implemented
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It is important to note again that uncertainty has been modeled in a ‘fair’ way.
Under other, perhaps more realistic alternatives, the status quo would enjoy
additional advantages. Furthermore, the linear tax scheme does not seem to be the
best candidate for stability. Thus, if our objective is to show that small degrees of
uncertainty about new alternatives can render the status quo policy stable, we
suspect that we have chosen the difficult candidate. For example, it seems intuitive
that it is easier for a strictly convex tax function (as the ones implemented in most
democratic economies) to be stable than for a linear one. It is also easy to find
numerical simulations in which the linear function cannot be stable for any
reasonable degree of uncertainty but a convex function can. However, we do not
have yet any general analytical result here. This is left for future research.
Even though we are far from providing a complete positive model of tax
determination — such a model should contain many other elements as, for
example, voting on multidimensional issues, multiparty elections, consideration of
the distributional effects of government expenditure, etc. — our result may be
useful to understand the observed stability of different tax policies in most western
countries.
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Appendix A
Differentiating in the expression of b with respect to r we obtain
›b (a 2 g )m
] ]]]]]5 2m›r
]Sm 2 r 1 D2
since g is the maximum marginal tax rate, we have that g.a and the sign of this
derivative is negative. Differentiating now b with respect to g we get
m
]2 r 1›b 2
] ]]]5 . (4)m›g
]m 2 r 1 2
1 1 1
Since 1/2 5ef(z)dz and m /2 5 mef(z)dz, ezf(z)dz 5 r, it follows that the
m m m
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numerator in Eq. (4) is negative. The denominator is clearly positive. Therefore
the sign in Eq. (4) is negative. Finaly, the derivative of a /b with respect to a is
ma
]]]b 2a m
]› ]S D m 2 r 1b 2
]] ]]]]]5 (5)2›a b
and the same argument as above yields
m m
] ]]]2 r 1 , 0, so . 1,m2
]m 2 r 1 2
and given that b,a, the sign of Eq. (5) is negative.
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